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Abstract
The Note argues that although the proposal fo a risk-based capital framework is a positive
move toward facilitating international cooperation on bank supervisory matters, it may encoutner
a number of difficulties in implementation. Part I examines the recent internationalization and
growing interdependency of the world’s banks as well as the role that Basle Committee plays
in fostering intenrational cooperation. Part II examines the proposed agreement for a risk-based
capital framework. Part III analyzes the difficulties that may arise in the Proposal’s implementa-
tion. This Note concludes that despite the lack of an enforcement mechanism, the Proposal will
in all likelihood achieve its purpose because it stands as a true model of international banking
cooperation.
NOTES
THE PROPOSED RISK-BASED CAPITAL FRAMEWORK:
A MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING
COOPERATION?
INTRODUCTION
The rapid internationalization of banking over the past
two decades has resulted in extensive interdependency among
the world's banks.' Supervision by national authorities over
domestic banks no longer provides an adequate framework for
regulating bank operations. 2 On December 10, 1987, the Ba-
sle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Prac-
tices3 ("Basle Committee" or "Committee") of the Bank for
International Settlements ("BIS") in Basle, Switzerland,4 an-
nounced a preliminary agreement by central bank governors of
twelve industrialized nations for a proposed risk-based capital
framework ("Proposal").5 The Proposal seeks to set minimum
1. Hackney & Shafer, The Regulation of International Banking: An Assessment of Inter-
national Institutions, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 475, 475 (1986).
2. Id.
3. The Basle Committee consists of representatives of central bank supervisory
authorities from Switzerland, Luxembourg, and the Group of Ten countries, which
are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. Comptroller of the Currency, Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. & Fed. Reserve Bd., Joint News Release, at 1 (Dec. 10, 1987) [hereinafter
Joint News Release] (available at Fordham International Law Journal office).
4. The Bank for International Settlements was established in 1930 and is located
in Basle, Switzerland. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 486. BIS is both an interna-
tional financial institution and a forum for discussion of common issues. Id. at 487.
It was established "to promote cooperation among central banks, to provide addi-
tional facilities for financial operations, and to act as trustee for post-World War I
reparations agreements." Id. at 486.
5. Bank for Int'l Settlements, Proposal for International Convergence of Capital
Measurement and Capital Standards, Committee on Banking Regulations and Super-
visory Practices Consultative Paper 1 n.1 (1987) [hereinafter BIS Proposal], reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. 530 (1988). The proposal will affect all banks that undertake significant
cross-border business and are regulated by supervisory authorities who are members
of the Basle Committee. Id. at 1-4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 530-33; Spencer & Mur-
ray-Jones, CapitalAdequacy: Towards a Level Playing Field, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Mar. 1988,
at 19 [hereinafter Spencer & Murray-Jones, Capital Adequacy]. For example, in the
United States, banks regulated by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System ("FRB"), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"), and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC") will be affected. Joint News Re-
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levels of capital in relation to the risks that banks undertake.6
The proposal is seen as a significant first step toward achieving
international banking supervisory cooperation in measuring
capital.7
This Note argues that although the proposal for a risk-
based capital framework is a positive move toward facilitating
international cooperation on bank supervisory matters, it may
encounter a number of difficulties in implementation. Part I
examines the recent internationalization and growing interde-
pendency of the world's banks as well as the role that the Basle
Committee plays in fostering international cooperation. Part
II examines the proposed agreement for a risk-based capital
framework. Part III analyzes the difficulties that may arise in
the Proposal's implementation. This Note concludes that de-
spite the lack of an enforcement mechanism, the Proposal will
in all likelihood achieve its purposes because it stands as a true
model of international banking cooperation.
lease, supra note 3, at 2. The FRB has jurisdiction over bank members of the Federal
Reserve System, see Federal Reserve Act, 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 241-250 (West 1945 &
Supp. 1988), and bank holding companies, see Bank Holding Company Act of 1956,
12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1841-1850 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). The OCC supervises national
banks. See National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C.A. 99 21-42 (West 1945 & Supp. 1988). The
FDIC has authority over insured state banks. See Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12
U.S.C.A. §§ 1811-1832 (West 1980 & Supp. 1988). For an overview of the regula-
tory structure of the United States banking industry, see 1 M. MALLOY, THE CORPO-
RATE LAW OF BANKS 28-52 (1988).
On January 25, 1988, the OCC, FRB, and FDIC issued a notice specifying in
great detail how the United States bank regulators plan on applying the proposal to
United States banks, whether or not internationally active. Spencer & Murray-Jones,
Capital Adequacy, supra, at 23; see Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed Guidelines,
53 Fed. Reg. 8550 (Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1988).
6. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 532.
7. New Banking Standards Unveiled, DUN'S Bus. MONTH, Feb. 1987, at 27, col. 2.
The proposal is similar to the agreement between the United States and the United
Kingdom issued on January 8, 1987, for a proposal on primary capital and capital
adequacy assessment. Spencer & Murray-Jones, Capital Adequacy, supra note 5, at 19;
see also Murray-Jones & Spencer, The US/UK Proposal on Capital Adequacy (pts. 1 & 2),
INT'L FIN. L. REV., Aug. 1987, at 20, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept. 1987, at 27 (for an
overview of the United States' and the United Kingdom's proposed agreement). The
Basle Proposal is more significant because it includes 12 industrialized nations rather
than just two. See BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 530. In the
words of Federal Reserve Board chairman Paul Volcker the agreement is "a break-
through . . . a step toward international consistency." Yang, US & Britain Propose a
Rule on Bank Capital, Wall St. J., Jan. 9, 1987, at 3, col. 4.
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I. THE GLOBALIZATION OF BANKING AND
THE BASLE COMMITTEE
The dramatic expansion of international banking in the
past two decades has left international regulation and supervi-
sion far behind. 8 Domestic banking authorities are unable to
supervise their banks' international activities adequately be-
cause of significant differences in foreign regulatory policies. 9
However, great strides have been achieved by the Basle Com-
mittee in encouraging supervisory cooperation and in develop-
ing greater uniformity in banking standards.' 0
A. The Internationalization of Banking
International banking is now a major component of over-
all banking activity in many countries." Because of increased
trade and capital flow among nations,'" there has been a grow-
ing tendency for banks to transact business through their for-
eign branch offices.' 3 Banks have recognized the strategic ad-
vantage of providing their clients with easy access to interna-
tional markets.' 4 In addition, banks have considered it
necessary to establish themselves abroad to protect their com-
petitive position in the face of the expansion of Eurocurrency
markets.15  International banks have also become in-
termediaries between oil-exporting and oil-importing coun-
tries because of a series of oil crises in the late 1970s.16
Unfortunately, supervision of domestic banks has not kept
8. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 475.
9. R. PECCHIOLI, THE INTERNATIONALISATION OF BANKING: THE POLICY ISSUEs 67
(1983); Lamfalussy, Worldwide Competition in Financial Markets: Issues for Banking Super-
visors, ISSUES BANK REG., Winter 1987, at 15, 22.
10. Cooke, Overview of International Supervisory Issues, IssuEs BANK REG., Summer
1984, at 3, 5 [hereinafter Cooke, Overview].
11. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 51.
12. R. DALE, THE REGULATION OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 2 (1986); R. PECCHI-
OLI, supra note 9, at 16.
13. R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2; R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 51.
14. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 52.
15. R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2; R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 52. Eurocurrency
markets are markets in which currencies are deposited outside the country of issue.
R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2. This creates new opportunities in terms of new custom-
ers and borrowers. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 52.
16. R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2. As a result of the ongoing oil crisis, oil-export-
ing and oil-importing countries experienced balance of payments instability. Id.
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pace with the rapid growth in international banking.' 7 The
failure of various national banking supervisory systems to keep
up with the recent growth is evidenced by the rash of bank fail-
ures during the 1970s in the United States and in Europe'8 and
the global debt crisis that emerged in 1982.19 National super-
visory authorities have increasingly been confronted with
problems arising from complex international banking struc-
tures and from differences in foreign regulatory policies.20
The differences in regulatory policies have created advantages
for some banking nations and disadvantages for others. 21 Na-
tional supervisory authorities have been reluctant to modify
their regulations for fear that any change will impair their
banks' competitive advantage.22
Because of the interdependency of the international bank-
ing system, the difficulties experienced by one domestic bank
can affect other members of the banking community and
weaken the entire system.2 3 The stability of the world's bank-
ing system and the creation of a level playing field where banks
may compete equally in the international arena have emerged
as major policy issues among banking authorities.2 4
17. Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision of International Lending: Part 1, 19 INT'L
LAw. 1059, 1063-64 (1985) [hereinafter Friesen, Part I]; Hackney & Shafer, supra note
1, at 475.
18. Friesen, Part I, supra 17, at 1060-64; R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2, 156-67.
19. Note, New Controls on Global Debt: The International Lending Supervision Act of
1983, 17 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 425 (1984). In 1974, Germany's largest private bank,
I.D. Herstatt, failed, and two large state banks, Hessische Landesbank Girozentrale
and Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale, suffered severe losses from foreign ex-
change dealings. J. BAKER, INTERNATIONAL BANK REGULATION 15-16 (1978). In addi-
tion, Italy's Banca Privata and several secondary banks in the United Kingdom failed.
Id. In Switzerland, where banking has been considered very stable, the Lugano office
of Lloyds Bank International suffered large foreign exchange losses in 1974. Id. In
the United States in 1974, the Franklin National Bank failed as a result of overexten-
sion of foreign exchange trading. Id.
20. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 67.
21. Measuring the Foreign-Exchange Value of the Dollar, 73 Fed. Res. Bull., 411, 435,
436 (1987) [hereinafter Measuring Foreign-Exchange].
22. Id.
23. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 104.
24. R. DALE, supra note 12, at 2; Monroe-Davies, Capital Ratios Are Only One Step,
BANKER, May 1987, at 55; Yang, supra note 7.
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B. The Basle Committee
The Basle Committee2 1 is made up of bank supervisors
from the so-called Group of Ten nations as well as Luxem-
bourg and Switzerland.26 It was established in 1974 by the
Bank for International Settlements,27 an organization of thirty
central banks.28
The Basle Committee has three primary objectives.29
First, it aims to provide a forum where supervisory authorities
may meet to develop closer personal communication and mu-
tual cooperation. 0 Second, it seeks to formulate guidelines
for the supervision of banks' foreign offices and activities,
thereby eliminating significant gaps in international supervi-
sory arrangements.3 ' Finally, the Committee attempts to ex-
25. For background on the Basle Committee, see Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Com-
mittee, ISSUES BANK REG., Summer 1984, at 7 [hereinafter Cooke, Basle Supervisors'
Committee]. The Committee is also known as the Cooke Committee after its chairman,
W. Peter Cooke. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 488.
26. Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, supra note 25, at 7; Hackney & Shafer,
supra note 1, at 488.
27. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 488.
28. Members include Albania, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, South Africa, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, West Ger-
many, and Yugoslavia. 1 UNION OF INT'L ASS'NS, YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ORGA-
NIZATIONS F0184g (22d ed. 1985).
29. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVI-
SION: THE RECORD TO DATE 2, 15 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter INTERNATIONAL COORDINA-
TION OF BANK SUPERVISION]; Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, supra note 25, at 8;
Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking Organization: Evolving Techniques for Cooperation
Among Supervisor'y Authorities, 3J. COMP. CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 244, 245 (1981) [herein-
after Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking].
30. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 2, 15;
Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, supra note 25, at 8; Cooke, Supervising Multinational
Banking, supra note 29, at 245.
31. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 2, 15;
Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking, supra note 29, at 245. The Basle Commit-
tee's first achievement in improving cooperative supervision of international banking
was its Concordat in 1975. Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices, The New Concordat-Principles for the Supervision of Banks' Foreign Establishments,
ISSUES BANK REG., Summer 1984, at 25 [hereinafter The New Concordat]. The Concor-
dat set out broad guidelines delineating responsibilities among national supervisory
authorities for the supervision of banks operating in more than one jurisdiction. Id.
The Concordat provides that:
(1) The supervision of foreign banking establishments should be the joint
responsibility of host and parent authorities.
(2) No foreign banking establishment should escape supervision, each
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amine risks that arise from international banking. 32 The Basle
Committee seeks to maintain a delicate balance between pre-
serving national interests and freedom of the international
marketplace.33
Agreements are reached only by a consensus of the mem-
country should ensure that foreign banking establishments are supervised,
and supervision should be adequate as judged by both host and parent au-
thorities.
(3) The supervision of liquidity should be the primary responsibility of host
authorities since foreign establishments generally have to conform to local
practices for their liquidity management and must comply with local regula-
tions.
(4) The supervision of solvency of foreign branches should be essentially a
matter for the parent authority. In the case of subsidiaries, while primary
responsibility lies with the host authority, parent authority should take ac-
count of the exposure of their domestic banks' foreign subsidiaries and joint
ventures because of the parent banks' moral commitment in this regard.
(5) Practical cooperation would be facilitated by transfers of information
between host and parent authorities and by granting of permission for in-
spections by or on behalf of parent authorities on the territory of the host
authority. Every effort should be made to remove any legal restraints (par-
ticularly in the field of professional secrecy or national sovereignty) which
might hinder these forms of co-operation.
Cooke, Developments in Co-operation Among Banking Supervisory Authorities, 3 J. COMP.
CORP. L. & SEC. REG. 253, 256 (1981).
The Concordat was revised in 1983 to clarify certain issues. The New Concordat,
supra, at 26. The revised Concordat does not contradict the guidelines set out in the
original Concordat. Id. The revised Concordat recommends "best practices" for the
division of responsibilities between parent and host authorities in the supervision of
foreign bank establishments. Id. There are three main differences in the revised edi-
tion:
First, .... the revised Concordat incorporates the principle of consolidated
supervision as an important technique of supervision to enable parent au-
thorities to monitor the overall risk exposure and capital adequacy of bank-
ing groups. Adoption of this principle does not, however, imply any lessen-
ing of host authorities' responsibilities and the revised Concordat
recognises that the responsibilities of host and parent authorities should to
some extent overlap each other. Second .... [it] reiterat[es] the objective of
the original document that no international banking operation should es-
cape effective supervision, [and] addresses further ways in which any super-
visory gaps can be prevented .... Third, [it] makes explicit what was im-
plicit in the earlier paper-it addresses questions of supervisory responsibil-
ity and not those of lender of last resort.
Id.
The revised Concordat has been endorsed by the Basle Committee member
countries and is currently being implemented. Bench & Sable, International Lending
Supervision, 11 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 427, 431 (1981).
32. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 2, 15;
Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, supra note 25, at 8.
33. Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking, supra note 29, at 245.
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ber nations and attempt to take into consideration the diverse
nature of each member's laws and regulatory practices. 34 The
Committee has no direct power to implement any changes in
national laws.35 Thus, although each member nation commits
itself in good faith to follow the Committee's guidelines, each
is still free to do as it chooses.36 It is up to the member nations
themselves to effect any changes in their national laws or regu-
lations.3 7
For several years the Basle Committee has been working
toward the goal of formulating an agreement for a more strin-
gent capital framework.38 Committee members believe that
banks operating internationally should strengthen their capital
practices and that, above all, capital should not be allowed to
deteriorate further than it has in recent years.3 9
II. THE PROPOSED RISK-BASED CAPITAL FRAMEWORK
The Basle Committee's Proposal for international conver-
gence of capital measurement and capital standards was
prompted by growing concern among supervisors worldwide
about the declining levels of capital held by banks.4 ° The Pro-
posal has two objectives. 4' First, it aims to strengthen the sta-
bility of the international banking system by fortifying the capi-
tal resources that banks are required to maintain.42 Second, it
seeks to remove competitive inequalities that arise from differ-
ences in national supervisory requirements.43 Specifically, the
Proposal includes a uniform definition of capital,44 a risk-based
34. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 16.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 530; Holland, Foreign
Bank Capital and the United States Federal Reserve Board, 20 INT'L LAw. 785, 812-14
(1986).
39. Bench & Sable, supra note 31, at 431.
40. Cooke, Overview, supra note 10, at 5.
41. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 2; Measuring Foreign-Exchange, supra note
21, at 437.
42. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 2; Measuring Foreign-Exchange, supra note
21, at 437.
43. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 2; Measuring Foreign-Exchange, supra note
21, at 437.
44. BIS Proposal, supra note 3, at 4-10, annex 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 533-38,
550-54.
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45 46capital ratio, and a common minimum standard ratio.
A. Uniform Definition of Capital
Capital is the financial cushion that banks maintain to ab-
sorb unforeseen losses in times of economic stress.4 7 A capital
adequacy standard is the minimum level of capital that banks
are required to maintain to ensure the stability and solvency of
banking practices.4 8 It is expressed as a percentage of assets.49
The Proposal establishes a uniform definition of capital,
referred to as adjusted primary capital,50 because different na-
tions have varying definitions of what constitutes capital and
different methods to account for capital.5 ' The calculation of
adjusted primary capital includes four factors:52 Tier 1 (Core
Capital), 53 Tier 2 (Supplementary Capital),54 goodwill,55 and
45. Id. at 10-18, annex 2-3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538-46, 554-60.
46. Id. at 18-19, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 546-47.
47. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 25;
R. DALE, supra note 12, at 182; Nash, 12 Countries Want Banks To Increase Capital, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 11, 1987, at A3, col. 3.
48. Malloy, U.S. International Banking and the New Capital Adequacy Requirements:
New, Old and Unexpected, 7 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 75, 75 n.l (1988) [hereinafter Mal-
loy, U.S. International Banking].
49. Malloy, U.S. International Banking, supra note 48, at 75 n. 1.
50. The risk-based capital ratio is to be calculated as follows: "Adjusted Primary
Capital [divided] by Risk-weighted assets and off-balance-sheet items [plus] Allow-
ance for loan and lease losses (exclusive of reserves for identified losses, such as
allocated transfer risk reserves) [minus] Appropriate adjustments." Proposed Risk-
Based Capital Framework, 52 Fed. Reg. 5119, 5133 (Fed. Reserve Sys. 1987).
51. Cooke, Overview, supra note 10, at 5. See generally Friesen, The Regulation and
Supervision of International Lending:. Part H, 20 INT'L LAw. 153 (1986) [hereinafter Frie-
sen, Part II]; Friesen, Part I, supra note 17, at 1059. Friesen examines in detail regula-
tory and supervisory banking systems of the United States, the United Kingdom, the
Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzer-
land.
52. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 550-54.
53. Id. Tier 1 consists of core capital, which is equity capital and published
reserves from post-tax retained earnings. Id. Because of the soundness of Tier I
capital, Tier I elements must make up at least 50% of adjusted primary capital. Id. at
4-5, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 533-34.
54. Id. at 5-10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 534-37. Tier 2 is limited to supplemen-
tary capital up to a total amount equal to that of Tier 1 elements. Id. annex 1, at 1,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M, at 550. The supplementary capital elements are undisclosed
reserves, asset revaluation reserves, general provisions/general loan-loss reserves,
hybrid debt/equity capital instruments, and subordinated term debt. Id. annex 1,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 550-54. Subordinated term debt will be limited to a maximum
of 50% of Tier 1 elements. Id. Hidden reserves may be included but are subject to a
55% discount on the difference between the historic cost book value and market
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certain investments in other financial institutions.5 6 The equa-
tion used to calculate adjusted primary capital is:
[(Tier 1 - goodwill) + Tier 2] - (certain investments in
other financial institutions).57
Adjusted primary capital is the numerator in the calculation of
the risk-based capital ratio.58 The denominator of the risk-
based capital ratio-the weighted risk-asset base 5 9-measures
the relative riskiness of different categories of a bank's assets. 6°
B. Risk-Based Capital Ratio
The risk-based capital ratio aims to quantify and account
for financial factors that may significantly affect a bank's level
of capital adequacy, including those factors that are not appar-
ent on a bank's balance sheet ("off-balance sheet items"). 6'
Broadly speaking, the ratio measures weighted risk against ad-
value. Id. at 6, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 534-35. This reflects concerns about market
volatility and tax charges that would arise when such gains are realized. Id.
In additon, the Basle Committee realizes that it is not always possible to distin-
guish clearly between general loan-loss reserves that are generally freely available
and those that are earmarked for identified losses. Id. at 7, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at
535-36. This uncertainty results from the present diversity of accounting, supervi-
sory, and fiscal policies with respect to provisioning and to the national definitions of
capital. Id. Therefore, inevitably, there will be differences in the characteristics of
general provisions/general loan-loss reserves maintained by each countries' banks.
Id. In light of these uncertainties, the Basle Committee plans to develop proposals to
ensure consistency in the definition of general loan-loss reserves by 1990. Id.
55. Goodwill is an "intangible asset that represents the difference between the
book value of a business and its purchase (or sale) price when the latter is greater
than the book value; an asset representing the value of the proprietorship of a busi-
ness in excess of the amount of proprietorship appearing on the books, the amount
by which the price that a corporation pays for the assets of a business exceeds the
proprietary interest of the owners." L. DAVIDS, DICTIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCE
105 (1978).
56. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 1, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 551. These
investments include investments in unconsolidated banking and financial subsidiary
companies and investments in the capital of banks and financial institutions. Id.
57. Id.
58. See supra note 50.
59. Malloy, U.S. International Banking, supra note 48, at 89.
60. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538-39; Measuring
Foreign-Exchange, supra note 21, at 437.
61. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. "The principal impact of the pro-
posal will generally fall on large banking institutions and those with significant off-
balance sheet exposures." Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed Guidelines, 53
Fed. Reg. 8550, 8563 (Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp.
1988).
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justed primary capital. 62 The weighted risk is the denominator
of the risk-based capital ratio.63 It consists of on-balance 64 and
on-balance sheet credit risk equivalents (converted off-balance
sheet items), 65 to which allowances for loan and lease losses66
are added, and from which so-called "appropriate adjust-
ments "67 are deducted.6' The calculation of the weighted risk-
asset base (denominator) is:
[(On-balance sheet item X risk weight) + ((off-balance
sheet item X credit risk conversion factor) X risk weight)]
+ (allowances for loan and lease losses) - (appropriate ad-
justments) 69
Off-balance sheet items are weighted according to risks
through a two-step process. 70  First, they are converted into
credit risk equivalents by multiplying principal amounts by a
credit-risk conversion factor. 71 Off-balance sheet instruments
62. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538.
63. Malloy, U.S. International Banking, supra note 48, at 89; see supra note 50.
64. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538. On-balance
sheet items include, generally, assets, loans, and claims. Id. annex 2, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. at 554-55.
65. Id. at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538. Off-balance sheet items do not show
up on a bank's balance sheet. Editorial, International Banking-Off-Balance Sheet Expo-
sures of Banks, 1986 J. Bus. L. 178. The growth of off-balance sheet activities has
caused national concern because it is not accounted for on a balance sheet. Id. The
risk off-balance sheet activities carry are in principle no different from those associ-
ated with on-balance sheet activities and can weaken a bank's soundness just as easily
as risks associated with on-balance sheet activities. Id. Off-balance sheet items in-
clude guarantees, floating-rate notes, swaps, letters of credit, and such. BIS Propo-
sal, supra note 5, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 555-60.
66. General loan-loss and lease reserves are created to protect against the possi-
bility of future losses. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 6-7, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 535-
36. These will not include reserves that have been already set aside for identified
losses, as these reserves will not be freely available. Id.
67. Adjustments may be made by supervisory authorities if their final supervi-
sory judgment of a bank's capital adequacy significantly differs from the results
drawn from the calculation of the risk-based ratio. Murray-Jones & Spencer, The
US/UK Proposal on Capital Adequacy (pt. 1), supra note 7, at 23.
68. See supra note 50.
69. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 2, at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 550-54; see
also supra note 50.
70. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 17-18, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545-46,
555-60.
71. Id.; see also Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg.
8550, 8567 (Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1988) (for a
sample calculation of credit-risk equivalents).
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are divided into five broad categories according to credit risk. 72
The category determines which credit-risk conversion factor is
to be applied. 73  Second, the on-balance sheet credit-risk
72. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 555-60. The
framework primarily measures credit risk in the capital assessment. Id. at 3, reprinted
in 27 I.L.M. at 532. However, the Basle Committee believes that other risks such as
interest rate risk and investment risk should also be taken into account by supervisors
in capital adequacy assessment. Id. The Committee is presently examining ways to
incorporate these risks into the framework. Id. The United States federal banking
authorities have emphasized that complete compliance with the risk-based capital
framework might not be sufficient to determine a bank's relative strength and that
other factors will also be reviewed. Spencer & Murray-Jones, Capital Adequacy, supra
note 5, at 21. These factors include
the composition and diversification of the loan portfolio, the level and sever-
ity of problem and classified assets, the quality, trend and variability of earn-
ings, the dividend payout ratio, and the level and trend of retained earnings,
liquidity and the structure of liabilities, the effectiveness of loan and invest-
ment policies, and management's overall ability to monitor and control
risks.
Id.
73. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 17-18, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545-46. The off-
balance-sheet items are divided into five broad categories:
(1) Direct credit substitutes that substitute for loans. Id. at 17, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. at 545. These items will have a 100% credit risk conversion factor. Id.
For example, "general guarantees of indebtedness, bank acceptance guarantees
and standby letters of credit serving as financial guarantees for loans and securi-
ties." Id.
(2) Trade-related contingencies will carry a 50% credit risk conversion factor.
Id. For example, "performance bonds, bid bonds, warranties and standby letters
of credit related to particular transactions." Id.
(3) Short-term, self-liquidating trade-related contingent liabilities arising from
the movement of goods will have a 20% credit risk conversion factor. Id. at 17-
18, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545-46. For example, documentary credits collateral-
ized by the underlying shipments. Id.
(4) Commitments with a long-term original maturity, and all revolving under-
writing facilities and note issuance facilities, will have a 50% credit risk conver-
sion factor. Id. at 18, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545-46. Under a revolving under-
writing facility an agent purchases Euronotes at an amount requested by the is-
suer. Id. "A Euronote is a short-term promissory note typically issued in the
Eurodollar market in bearer form." Logan, Mahoney, Slade & White, The Securi-
tization of U.S. Bank Activities in the Eurodollar Market-Issues for U.S. Counsel, 11
N.C.J. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 539, 543 (1985). Under a note issuance facility, "an
uncommitted tender panel of financial institutions competitively bids to
purchase Euronotes in an aggregate face amount requested by the issuer, which
results in the lowest possible interest expense to the issuer." Id. Shorter-term
commitments or commitments that can be cancelled at any time that generally
carry only low risks will carry a zero weight. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 18,
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 546. This is justified on de minimis grounds. Id.
(5) Interest and foreign-exchange rate-related items, such as swaps, options,
and futures, are given special treatment because banks are not exposed to credit
risk for the full face value of their contracts. Id. at 18, annex 3, reprinted in 27
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equivalents are assigned a risk-weight also according to the de-
gree of credit risk of the obligor. 74 The Proposal establishes
five broad categories of risk weights: 0%, 10%, 20%, 50%,
and 100%. 75 The greater the risk of the asset, the higher the
risk weight assigned. 76 On-balance sheet items go through a
one-step process7 7 that is identical to the second step of the
off-balance sheet process.78 The Proposal grants supervisory
authorities flexibility in determining the appropriate category
within which assets, both on-balance and off-balance sheet,
I.L.M. at 546, 555-60. Banks risk only the potential cost of replacing cash flow if
the counterparty defaults. Id. The credit equivalent amounts will depend on the
maturity of the instrument and on the volatility of the rates underlying the in-
strument. The amounts will be calculated in one of two ways, it being under-
stood that banks would not be permitted to switch between the two. Id. annex 3,
at 5 n.3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 559 n.3. The "current exposure initial" calcu-
lates the current replacement cost by marking to market and adding on a factor
to represent the potential exposure during the remaining life of the contract. Id.
annex 3, at 3-5, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 557-59. Because of the complexity of this
approach, an alternative formula is the "original exposure method," where the
conversion factor is based on the nominal principal sum of each contract accord-
ing to its type and maturity. Id. annex 3, at 5-6, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 559-60.
74. Id. at 17, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545, 555-60; Spencer & Murray-
Jones, Capital Adequacy, supra note 4, at 23.
75. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 17, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 545, 555-
60. The risk weight of 0% will be applied to cash, balances and claims on domestic
central banks, loans to domestic central governments, securities issued by domestic
central governments, and loans and other amounts fully collateralized by cash or
domestic central government securities or that are fully guaranteed by domestic cen-
tral governments. Id. annex 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 554-55. The risk weight of 0%
or 20% will be applied to claims on International Bank Reconstruction and Develop-
ment and regional development banks at national discretion. Id. European Commu-
nity countries will treat their European institutions consistently. Id. Twenty percent
will be applied to claims on domestic and foreign banks with short-term original ma-
turity, claims on domestic banks with long-term original maturity and loans guaran-
teed by domestic banks, claims on foreign central governments in local currency fi-
nanced by local currency liabilities, and cash items. Id. Zero, twenty, or fifty percent
will be applied to claims on the domestic public sector, not including central govern-
ment at national discretion and loans guaranteed by such institutions. Id. Fifty per-
cent will be applied to loans to residential house purchase owner-occupiers that are
fully secured by mortgages. Id. One hundred percent will be applied to claims on
the private sector, cross-border claims on foreign banks with a long-term original
maturity, claims on foreign central governments (unless the 20% was applied), claims
on commercial companies, premises, plants, and equipment and other fixed assets,
real estate and other investments owned by the public sector, capital instruments
issued by other banks (unless deducted from capital), and all other assets. Id.
76. Id. annex 2-3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 554-60.
77. Id. at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 539.
78. Id. at 10, annex 3, at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538-39, 555.
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fall. 7 9 Given the broad categories set out for both risk weights
and off-balance sheet items, supervisory authorities will face
uncertainties in determining which category an item falls
80into.
The result of dividing adjusted primary capital (the nu-
merator) by the weighted risk-asset base (the denominator) is
the so-called risk-based capital ratio,8 which is used to mea-
sure the adequacy of a bank's capital structure.82
C. Common Minimum Capital Requirement
The purpose of calculating the risk-asset capital ratio is to
determine the minimum level of capital that a bank must main-
tain to guard against unforeseen losses.8 3 This minimum
amount, which is expressed as a percentage of assets, is re-
ferred to as capital adequacy. 4 A sufficient level of capital ade-
quacy also helps to create public confidence in a bank. 5
The Basle Committee has tentatively set the ultimate mini-
mum target of capital adequacy at 8%.86 However, two mem-
ber countries, West Germany and France, prefer to consult
with their banks without being bound to a numerical stan-
dard.8 7 Banks would be given five years from the date of the
Proposal's agreement, that is, until 1992, to make any neces-
sary adjustments to implement the Proposal. 88  National au-
thorities would also be free to adopt higher levels or more
stringent supplementary arrangements to measure capital.89
79. Id. at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 539; Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 1.
80. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 532.
81. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 10-18, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538-46; Friesen,
Comparative Bank Capital Guidelines, 3 REV. FIN. SERVICES REG. 113, 117 (1987) [herein-
after Friesen, Comparative Bank]; see also Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed
Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8565 (Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. 1988) (for a sample calculation of the Risk-Based Capital Ratio); supra note
50.
82. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 10, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 538.
83. Id. at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 530.
84. Malloy, U.S. International Banking, supra note 48, at 75 n.l.
85. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 25.
86. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 18-19, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 546-47. A
higher specific ratio may be set by United States regulators for any particular bank.
Spencer & Murray-Jones, Capital Adequacy, supra note 5, at 23.
87. Norman, Ways to Boost Global Banking Stability Proposed by 12 Industrialized Na-
tions, Wall St. J., Dec. 11, 1987, at 10, col. 1.
88. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 20, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 547-48.
89. Id. at 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 532.
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Overall, the proposed risk-based capital framework has
three primary objectives. 90 First, it provides an equitable and
consistent basis for making international capital comparison
among different banking systems. 9 t Second, it takes into ac-
count both on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet risk expo-
sures in assessing capital adequacy.9" Third, it avoids deter-
ring banks from holding liquid or low-risk assets.9 3
III. THE PROPOSAL. A TRUE MODEL OF
BANKING COOPERATION?
The Proposal for a risk-based capital framework is consid-
ered a landmark in international regulatory agreement.94 It is
significant because it addresses an area of great concern
among national supervisors.95 It also makes progress toward
international consistency and supervisory cooperation while
minimizing global competitive distortions.96
The Basle Committee recognizes that significant differ-
ences exist among countries in bank accounting and supervi-
sory practices.97 The proposed framework has provided na-
tional authorities with some flexibility in implementing the
risk-based capital measure.98 However, this flexibility does not
by itself eliminate the difficulties and obstacles that may arise
in implementation.
Banks of different countries are accustomed to different
types of supervision, ranging from a strict rule-based system to
an informal consultation system.9 9 Obtaining compliance with
90. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 2.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Nash, Capital Plan Is Based on Risks Involved in Bank Assets, N.Y. Times, Feb. 1,
1988, at D8, col. 3 [hereinafter Nash, Capital Plan].
95. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text. Capital adequacy is a critical
factor in ensuring the safety and soundness of every banking system. R. DALE, supra
note 12, at 57-60.
96. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 1, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 530; Yang, supra note
7.
97. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 532; Friesen, Com-
parative Bank, supra note 81, at 113; Measuring Foreign-Exchange, supra note 21, at 439.
98. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 3-4, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 532; Joint News
Release, supra note 3, at 1.
99. J. BAKER, supra note 19, at 19. For example, United States bank supervision
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the Proposal may thus be difficult.'0 0 Moreover, two of the
twelve members involved, West Germany and France, have not
agreed to set a common minimum target capital standard.'
The other ten have agreed on 8% as the minimum capital ratio
to be achieved.10 2
The Proposal sets out broad categories for both the risk
weights 0 3 and the credit-risk conversion factors 0 4 to provide
national authorities with discretion in implementing the frame-
work.'0 5 However, the advantages of providing this flexibility
will lead banks to undertake excess risks. Indeed, although the
Proposal sets out to discourage banks from undertaking un-
necessarily high risks, 10 6 it may instead encourage banks to
take on higher credit and interest-rate risks.' 0 7 For example,
banks need to set aside less capital for loans to a domestic gov-
ernment because domestic government borrowings have far
lower capital requirements (0% risk weight) than loans to pri-
vate borrowers (100% risk weight).'0 8  And, because banks
view capital as a very expensive source of funds, they may be
encouraged to put more money in a high-risk, high-yielding
government instrument issued, for example, by a nearly insol-
vent town in the United States, than in a loan to a triple A, or
blue-chip, corporation. 0 9 In addition, because high-quality
loans have low returns on equity, banks may be motivated to
make high-credit loans or loans with high interest-rate risk to
obtain greater returns on equity." 0
Furthermore, because banks of different member nations
is highly rule-based and the United Kingdom's bank supervision is based on frequent
consultation and cooperation. Friesen, Part 1, supra note 17, at 1068-97.
100. Friesen, Comparative Bank, supra note 81, at 121.
101. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 19, annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 548, 555-
60; Norman, supra note 87, at 10, col. 1.
102. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 2, 18-19, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531, 546-47.
103. Id. annex 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 554-55.
104. Id. annex 3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 555-60.
105. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 1. The Proposal seeks to discourage
banks from undertaking high risks by requiring banks to put aside more capital for
higher risk activities than low risk activities. See BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 2,
3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 554-60.
106. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 2.
107. Bryan, Capital Guidelines Could Weaken Banks, Wall St. J., April 23, 1987, at
32, col. 3.
108. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 554-55.
109. Bryan, supra note 107, at 32, col. 3.
110. Id.
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at present determine capital differently, different burdens may
arise in the implementation of a uniform capital standard. For
example, some member nations' banks, particularly British,
West German, and Swiss banks, may find it fairly easy to meet
the proposed minimum capital requirement, while other mem-
ber nations' banks, including United States and Japanese
banks, may find it difficult. '1 For instance, the Proposal allows
hidden reserves to be included in the calculation of capital sub-
ject to a discount of 55%.112 Hidden reserves are the
unearned appreciation of assets. 1 3 They are determined by
calculating the difference between book value and market
value of assets." 4 Since hidden reserves are not considered
capital by West Germany's current banking regulations,115
West German banks will find it easier to meet the minimum
level of capital required.' 16 In contrast, Japanese banks will
find it harder to raise capital because the Proposal applies a
55% discount to their use of hidden reserves. 1 7 Japanese
banking regulation currently allows Japanese banks to include
up to 70% of hidden reserves in the calculation of capital."'
Key United States bankers are concerned by the Proposal
because they feel that it will adversely affect their competitive
position. For one thing, goodwill, which is routinely included
in current calculations of capital adequacy, is excluded by the
Proposal.I" For another, some United States banks may have
to raise additional capital to meet the minimum capital ratio of
111. Bank Regulation Levelling, ECONOMIST, Dec. 12-18, 1987, at 92.
112. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 1, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 551.
113. Friesen, Part I, supra note 17, at 1102 n.215. Hidden reserves are undis-
closed reserves representing "accumulated after-tax retained earnings that are not
disclosed on the balance sheet of a bank." Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed
Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8554 (Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit
Ins. Corp. 1988).
114. See L. DAVID, supra note 55, at 109.
115. Friesen, Part 1, supra note 17, at 1102 n.215.
116. Norman, Seventeen Industrial Nations Draft Pact on Big Banks' Capital-Adequacy
Needs, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 23, col. 2.
117. Id.
118. Semkow, The Deregulation of Japan's Financial Markets, Ir'L FIN. L. REV.,
Aug. 1987, at 39. As a Federal official commented, "'[the Japanese were pretty
heavily hair-cutted' by the agreement." Taylor, New Capital Rules Affect Some Banks,
Fed. Official Says, Wall St. J., Dec. 30, 1987, at 2, col. 5.
119. See BIS Proposal, supra note 5, annex 1, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 551.
The United States' top 10 banks have almost US$4 billion in goodwill that will no
longer be counted as capital after 1992. Nash, Capital Plan, supra note 94.
1988] INTERNATIONAL BANKING COOPERATION 793
8%, and thus may assume riskier obligations to compensate
for the lower profits generated by the higher capital require-
ments. 2 0 The Proposal might also restrict banks' ability to
enter into bank mergers because banks would be required to
maintain and reserve larger pools of capital.' 21 Finally, be-
cause the Proposal applies only to banks, banks may be placed
at a competitive disadvantage with investment houses. 122
The Basle Committee recognizes that its Proposal cannot
be completely effective unless it is communicated to supervi-
sory banking agencies in non-member countries. 23 Because
only twelve countries have agreed to the proposed frame-
work, 24 its effect is limited. 25 Competitive distortions cannot
be totally eliminated if only twelve countries in the world par-
ticipate in the Proposal's implementation. 26 In addition, the
stability of the international banking system may be weakened
by the less stringent capital requirements of non-member
countries. 7
Despite these concerns, the Basle Committee's Proposal is
significant because it provides a forum for cooperation and for
improving the guidelines within the Proposal. 128 In fact, the
Proposal itself provides for assessments of each member na-
tion's progress in meeting the proposed capital standards dur-
ing the transitional period set by the Committee. 29 The Com-
mittee will take account of differences in each member nation's
banking policies and procedures in consultations for future
120. Nash, Plan Could Stall Banking Mergers, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1988, at Al, col.
1, at D8, col. 3.
121. Id.
122. Berg, Fed Acts on Banks'Swap Risk, N.Y. Times, March 5, 1987, at DI, col. 6.,
at D6, col. 4.
123. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 28.
124. Joint News Release, supra note 3, at 1.
125. See Cooke, Overview, supra note 10, at 4. Some jurisdictions, such as Hong
Kong, "do not formally regulate capital adequacy, while others make an essentially
judgemental assessment." R. DALE, supra note 12, at 91; Lamfalussy, supra note 9, at
22.
126. Malloy, U.S. International Banking, supra note 48, at 80.
127. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 34;
Monroe-Davis, supra note 24, at 55. As one commentator stated, "It may eventually
be ground into the dust by an unholy combination of national interest and national
and international bureaucracy." Monroe-Davis, supra note 24, at 55.
128. Cooke, Basle Supervisors' Committee, supra note 25, at 8; Cooke, Supervising
Multinational Banking, supra note 29, at 245.
129. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 2-3, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531-32.
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provisions.' This consideration itself may eliminate many of
the problems that exist within the Proposal.
The Basle Committee is also currently undergoing discus-
sions with the European Economic Community ("EEC" or
"Community") 13 with the goal of agreeing on a common ap-
proach to be applied to EEC banks.' 32 The Committee also
has contact with many other non-member countries. 133 For in-
stance, several Committee members are also members of other
regional banking groups. 3 4 Committee members also attend
130. Id. In fact, as three United States administrative agencies have noted, the
Basle Committee
does not mandate a completely uniform structure to be employed by all
countries. Rather, the framework attempts to recognize and accommodate,
within prescribed limits, unique features of individual countries arising from
differences in basic accounting procedures, in the structure and evolution of
banking and financial markets, and in fundamental supervisory methodolo-
gies and techniques. While not eliminating these differences, the Basle capi-
tal framework nonetheless represents a significant step toward the adoption
of more consistent international procedures for measuring and evaluating
capital adequacy in relation to a broadly-accepted international norm.
Risk-Based Capital; Notice of Proposed Guidelines, 53 Fed. Reg. 8550, 8551-52
(Dep't Treas., Fed. Reserve Sys. & Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 1988).
131. The Member States of the EEC are Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Portu-
gal, and Spain. Treaty Between the Member States of the European Communities
and the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic Concerning the Accession of
the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the European Economic Com-
munity and to the European Atomic Energy Community, O.J. L 302/9 (1985). Of the
12 Member States, the first seven are also members of the Basle Committee. BIS
Proposal, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531.
132. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531. "The Basle
Proposal concentrates on banks undertaking significant international business, while
the European Commission's proposal would apply to banks in the EC." Spencer &
Murray-Jones, Capital Adequacy, supra note 5, at 20-21.
133. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 28.
134. Id. For example, all the member countries of the Basle Committee are also
members of the Expert Group on Banking of the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development ("OECD"). See R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 7; see also supra
note 3 (for a list of the member countries of the Basle Committee). This group con-
sists of bank regulatory and supervisory officials from industrialized countries. Hack-
ney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 495. They are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the United Kingdom, and the United States. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 7. The
OECD has also prepared studies on differing national supervisory requi rements and
areas for convergence of requirements. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 495.
Japan is a member of the SEANZA (South-East Asia, New Zealand, and Austra-
lia) Forum of Bank Supervisors. Id. at 495-96. Forum members include Australia,
Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, New Zealand,
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other regional banking group meetings. 135 Furthermore, re-
ports of other regional banking groups' activities are included
in Committee annual reports.'" 6 In addition, discussions of
the Committee's activities are held at periodic international
conferences of bank supervisors. 3 7 Finally, the Committee is
also circulating the Proposal to the supervisory authorities of
non-member nations with the hope of encouraging a world-
wide standard of capital adequacy."13
A. A Legal Framework: Is It Necessary?
The Basle Proposal is essentially a "gentlemen's agree-
ment." It creates nothing more than an expectation of and a
reliance on compliance by all the member nations. 139 It does
not create any enforceable rights or duties. It merely estab-
lishes a set of guidelines that the members of the Basle Com-
mittee may follow if they so choose. 4 ' The Proposal's depen-
dence on cooperation as opposed to coercion may be both its
best and worst feature. Because there are no legal mechanisms
to enforce compliance, member nations may be encouraged to
resolve problems through negotiation and cooperation. The
Pakistan, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Thailand. Id. at 495-96. Non-members of the
Indian sub-continent, South-East Asia, and the Pacific Basin may also attend meet-
ings. Id. The Forum's purposes are to encourage cooperation in the exchange of
information and ideas and to discuss problems of common interest. Id. at 496.
135. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 28.
For example, members attend the meetings of the the OECD, SEANZA Forum of
Bank Supervisors, the Nordic Supervisory Group (which includes Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, and Iceland) and the Commission of Banking Supervisory and Reg-
ulatory Administration Authorities of Latin America and the Caribbean. Id. at 28-32.
136. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 28.
137. Id. The Committee has sponsored three international conferences: in
London in 1979, in Washington in 1981, and in Rome in 1984. Id.; Cooke, Develop-
ments in Co-operation Among Banking Supervisory Authorities 253, 255-56 (1981). Repre-
sentatives from nearly 100 countries attended the Rome conference. INTERNATIONAL
COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 28. All present endorsed the
revised Concordat. Id. at 28-29; see also supra note 31 (for an overview of the revised
Concordat).
138. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531.
139. Editorial, The Twilight Existence of Non-binding International Agreements, 71 AM.
J. INT'L L. 296, 299 (1977); see also BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 1-2, reprinted in 27
I.L.M. at 530-31 (setting out the framework in the form of a proposal and seeking to
achieve a set of conceptually sound recommendations).
140. BIS Proposal, supra note 5, at 2, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. at 531; see also Lichten-
stein, Introductory Note, 27 I.L.M. 524 (1988) (the Proposal has been endorsed by
member countries as a basis for wider consultations).
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lack of legal mechanisms, however, may lead member nations
to skirt the Proposal's provisions if it is in their national inter-
est to do so.' 4 '
The forces that encourage compliance with the Proposal
are essentially non-legal. For one thing, the agreement has
political and moral weight.' 4 2 For another, member nations
may comply because of what is referred to as "law habit."' 
43
That is, banking authorities may comply with the Proposal's
guidelines to maintain their governments' credit rating or
good standing, or because they do not want to disturb the ex-
isting structure of cooperation. 44 Each member nation has
the duty to negotiate in good faith and no member nation will
deny that it has negotiated in good faith.145 There is, however,
no legal forum to determine whether there was good faith.'
46
In the absence of a legal mechanism, a member nation's refusal
to comply with the proposed framework cannot be met with
any compulsory measures.' 4 7
141. See Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety", 29 INT'L & COMP. L. Q.
549, 551 (1980) (It is recognized that "joint statements of policy... will remain alive
only so long as the states concerned see it to be in their mutual interest to concert
their policies. One simply cannot think of 'violations' of such instruments.").
142. See Editorial, supra note 139, at 302 (It is recognized that "agreements [are]
intended to have 'political and moral weight' even if legally non-binding. It would
not be unreasonable ... in the light of the significance accorded to such agreements
in international relations.").
143. See Baxter, supra note 141, at 556 (It is recognized that "[t]he forces that
make for compliance with such instruments are manifold but essentially non-legal.")
Bureaucrats follow through force of "law habit."
144. Id. Indeed, the Basle Committee has been working on the problem of capi-
tal erosion since 1982. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra
note 29, at 25. In June 1982, the Committee issued a paper on the capital adequacy
of banks operating internationally to resist any "further erosion" in capital ratios. Id.
145. Representatives of each member country "commit themselves to work in
their countries for the principles agreed to by the Committee." INTERNATIONAL CO-
ORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at 16.
146. See Baxter, supra note 141, at 552 ("The assertion that the duty to negotiate
or to conclude an agreement implies a duty to negotiate in good faith is an empty
one. Unless appropriate machinery has been set up, no court or other agency can
determine whether a state has or has not negotiated in good faith and what the duty
to negotiate in good faith requires.").
147. Id. at 553-54 (It is recognized that "in the absence of institutional machin-
ery .... a party's refusal to follow the exhortations or recommendations of the treaty
cannot be met with any measures of compulsion.").
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B. The EEC's Formalized Approach
The existence of binding authority, however, does not
necessarily guarantee better results. In contrast to the Basle
Committee's informal approach to banking coordination, the
European Economic Community has a more formalized ap-
proach.1 48 The Treaty of Rome, which established the EEC,
provides the legal basis for the coordination of banking legisla-
tion. 149 It provides for the use of a legal instrument, directives,
to help promote the harmonization of banking legislation and
supervisory cooperation."'
The ultimate goal of the EEC's efforts is to achieve a uni-
form legislative and supervisory banking system throughout
the Community.' 5 ' The EEC has to date enacted two legal di-
rectives, the First Banking Coordination Directive 52 ("Coordi-
148. Cooke, Supervising Multinational Banking, supra note 29, at 245. The Treaty
of Rome envisioned the establishment of a common banking market that is to be
realized through the satisfaction of two conditions. The first is through freedom of
establishment and freedom to provide services. Treaty Establishing the European
Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, arts. 52-66, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd.
5179-I), at 23-27 (official English trans.), 298 U.N.T.S. at 37-42 (unofficial English
trans.) [hereinafter EEC Treaty]; Muller, A Legal Framework For International Supervi-
sion: The EEC Model, IssuEs BANK REG., Summer 1984, at 36. And the second is
through coordination of banking legislation so that greater uniformity in banking can
be achieved. EEC Treaty, supra, art. 57, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 25, 298 U.N.T.S.
at 40; Muller, supra, at 36 n.4.
149. See supra note 148.
150. EEC Treaty, supra note 148, art. 189, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1, at 60, 298
U.N.T.S. at 78-79. Article 189 of the Treaty provides:
In order to carry out their task the Council and the Commission shall, in
accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, make regulations, issue direc-
tives, take decisions, make recommendations or deliver opinions. A regula-
tion shall have general application. It shall be binding in its entirety and
directly applicable in all Member States. A directive shall be binding, as to
the result to be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed,
but shall leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods. A
decision shall be binding in its entirety upon those to whom it is addressed.
Recommendations and opinions shall have no binding force.
Id.
151. Muller, supra note 148, at 37. "Article 57 (in conjunction with Article 8) of
the Treaty of Rome states that at the end of the transitional period (on January 1,
1970), the coordination of banking legislation must have been effectuated." Id.
152. First Council Directive No. 77/780, O.J. L 322/30 (1977) [hereinafter Co-
ordination Directive]. In 1977, the Council of Ministers issued the First Banking Co-
ordination Directive. Id. preamble, O.J. L 322/30, at 30. The Coordination Directive
prohibits discriminatory treatment with regard to the establishment of banks and the
provision of services among Member States. Id. Among other things, it provides for
the elimination of most obstructive differences between Member State laws that ap-
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nation Directive") and the First Consolidation Directive 5 3
("Consolidation Directive"), in furtherance of this goal.' 54
The Coordination Directive seeks to introduce uniform au-
thorization requirements throughout the Community for com-
parable types of banks.' 5 5 In addition, the Consolidation Di-
rective prescribes the supervision of banks on a consolidated
basis.' 56 Unlike the Basle Committee, Member States are re-
quired to eliminate all legal obstacles to the exchange of infor-
mation necessary for consolidation, 5 7 and if necessary, EEC
members must adapt their national legislation to comply with
ply to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions; it calls for the
coordination of credit institutions to protect savings and to create equal conditions of
competition; and it calls for cooperation between competent authorities and the
Banking Advisory Committee ("Advisory Committee"). Id. It does not rule out
other forms of cooperation between the authorities. Id. The Coordination Directive
also specifies conditions under which banking authorization may be withdrawn or
given reasons for refusal or withdrawal of authorization. Id. art. 8, O.J. L 322/30, at
35. In addition, a limited right of appeal is allowed. Id. art. 13, OJ. L 322/30, at 36-
37. A measure of flexibility is allowed for because of the objective differences in the
laws of Member States. Id. preamble, 0.J. L 322/30, at 31. The Coordination Direc-
tive imposes only minimum requirements concerning minimum capital and manage-
ment. Id. The Member States may impose more stringent requirements subject to
two conditions. The requirements must be of a general nature and they must expire
at the end of the 12-year transitional period. Id.; Muller, supra note 148, at 38.
153. Council Directive No. 83/350, 0J. L 193/18 (1983) [hereinafter Consoli-
dation Directive]. This Directive requires consolidation of all majority-owned subsid-
iaries, including those located outside the country where the head office is located.
Id. arts. 3(1), 4, 6(1), 0.J. L 193/18, at 19-20. The Consolidation Directive has also
extended the obligation of cooperation to verify information received. Id. art. 5(4),
0.J. L 193/18, at 20. If a competent authority of one Member State wishes to verify
information from another Member State, the competent authority of the other Mem-
ber State must carry out the verification themselves, allow the requesting authority to
carry it out, or allow an auditor or expert to carry it out. Id.
154. See supra notes 151-153 and accompanying text.
155. Coordination Directive, supra note 152, preamble, 0.J. L 322/30, at 30-31.
The Coordination Directive also sets up uniform observation ratios in order to moni-
tor the solvency and liquidity of banks. Id. art. 6, 0.J. L 322/30, at 34. The Member
States must calculate the solvency and liquidity ratios despite its observation purpose
because this will help facilitate the harmonization process. Id.; Muller, supra note
148, at 38.
In addition, the Coordination Directive calls for the close collaboration of su-
pervisors of banks that operate outside the Member State other than where the head
office is located to supply one another with information concerning the management
and ownership of banks that would facilitate supervision, to examine banking condi-
tions and to monitor liquidity and solvency. Coordination Directive, supra note 152,
art. 7, 0.J. L 322/30, at 34-35.
156. Consolidation Directive, supra note 153.
157. Id. art. 5(1), 0.J. L 193/18, at 20; Muller, supra note 148, at 39.
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the directives. 1
58
Moreover, two groups,' 59 including the so-called Contact
Group, 60 work with the EEC Commission to achieve harmoni-
zation. 16  The Contact Group, which is much like the Basle
Committee, provides an informal forum for the Member
States' supervisory authorities.162 The purpose of the Contact
158. Consolidation Directive, supra note 153, art. 7(1), O.J. L 193/18, at 20.
159. The two groups are the Advisory Committee and the Contact Group.
Muller, supra note 148, at 38.
160. Schneider, The Contact Group of EEC Supervisory Authorities, ISSUES BANK REG.,
Summer 1984, at 15. The Contact Group was formed in 1972, two years before the
Basle Committee was formed. R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 106. The Contact
Group, like the Basle Committee, is an informal group consisting of supervisory au-
thorities from each Member State. Hackney & Shafer, supra note 1, at 492.
The Contact Group is made up of a chairman, who has a one year term, a per-
manent secretariat, and one representative from each national supervisory authority,
who is usually a senior practicing supervisor and attends in that capacity. Schneider,
supra, at 16. The Contact Group meets informally about three times a year and dis-
cussions are generally confidential. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVI-
SION, supra note 29, at 31. A representative of the EEC Commission also attends the
meetings. Schneider, supra, at 17. The meetings are held without technical advisors,
assistants or observers. Id. The Contact Group has felt that it should not become
directly involved in the harmonization of Community banking legislation. Id. The
chairman of the Contact Group also sits on the Basle Committee. Id. at 18. More-
over, there exists a mutual awareness of issues under discussion among the Basle
Committee and the EEC. Id.
161. Coordination Directive, supra note 152, art. 11, O.J. L 322/30, at 36;
Muller, supra note 148, at 38. The Advisory Committee was created by Article 11 of
the 1977 Coordination Directive, O.J. L 322/30, at 36. The Advisory Committee is a
high-level policy-making Committee that is backed by a secretariat from the EEC
Commission. Hackney & Schafer, supra note 1, at 491. The Advisory Committee is
made up of three representatives from each Member State plus the Commission. Co-
ordination Directive, supra note 152, art. 11(4), O.J. L 322/30, at 36. All discussions
are confidential unless otherwise decided by the Advisory Committee. Id. art. 11 (6),
Oj. L 322/30, at 36. The Advisory Committee also works closely with the Commis-
sion who then makes recommendations to the EEC Council. Id. art. 11(2), O.J. L
322/30, at 36; Clarotti, The Harmonization of Legislation Relating to Credit Institutions, 19
COMMON MKT. L. REV. 245, 264-65 (1982).
162. Schneider, supra note 160, at 15. The Contact Group works closely with
the Commission and the Advisory Committee in supporting coordination. id. at 17.
The Contact Group has several functions. Id. at 16. It facilitates the exchange of
information among supervisory authorities of the EEC Member States, including in-
formation about problems in banking that serves to warn other Member States of
potential problems, thereby assisting in the resolution of those problems and infor-
mation about developments in national supervisory legislation, administrative prac-
tices, and application of banking techniques that would lead Member State banks
toward a better understanding of different bank systems. Id. at 16. It also undertakes
detailed technical studies of the banking supervisory systems in the Member States.
Id. The Contact Group often submits study reports to other banking organizations,
such as the Basle Committee, the EEC Banking Advisory Committee, and to the EEC
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Group is to assist the Member States' understanding of each
other's supervisory systems and to facilitate cooperation in
banking coordination within the EEC. 163 The supervisory au-
thorities recognized the importance of developing practical co-
operation to maintain adequate supervision in the face of the
rapid pace of globalized banking.' 64 Despite the EEC's legal
structure, however, harmonized banking within the Commu-
nity is still in its infancy.' 65
The modest accomplishments of the EEC's efforts at coor-
dination 66 emphasize that the mere existence of a legal struc-
ture is not the sole, and may not be the ideal, means of achiev-
ing harmonization of supervisory matters. Indeed, it reveals
the need for precisely the sort of mutual cooperation that the
Basle Committee proposes. 67 Clearly, international coopera-
tion among supervisory authorities is an essential ingredient in
accommodating national differences and achieving worldwide
coordination of national banking supervision and regula-
tion. 168
CONCLUSION
It is widely recognized that differences in national supervi-
sion must be taken into account in formulating prudential
banking guidelines. National supervisors have stressed the im-
Commission. INTERNATIONAL COORDINATION OF BANK SUPERVISION, supra note 29, at
31. Finally, the Contact Group acts as an informal link between the Commission and
the Banking Advisory Committee in working towards the harmonization of the bank-
ing system. Schneider, supra note 160, at 17.
163. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
164. Schneider, supra note 160, at 15. The Advisory Committee's general task is
to assist the Commission in the formulation of new general policy guidelines to sub-
mit to the Council concerning future banking coordination. Coordination Directive,
supra note 152, art. 11(2), Oj. L 322/30, at 36. The second general task of the Advi-
sory Committee is to assist the Commission in implementing the Coordination Direc-
tive. Id. art. 6(4), O.J. L 322/30, at 34. The third is to carry out specific tasks speci-
fied in the Coordination Directive, such as establishing the uniform solvency and
liquidity ratio. Id. art. 6(1), O.J. L 322/30, at 34.
165. Muller, supra note 148, at 37.
166. Bench & Sable, supra note 31, at 433. See generally Muller, supra note 148, at
37.
167. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
168. R. DALE, supra note 12, at 171. "[Tjhe traditional distinction between 'for-
mal' and 'informal' approaches to banking supervision does not seem of great rele-
vance in practical terms. Much more important is the extent to which supervision is
conducted in a flexible manner." R. PECCHIOLI, supra note 9, at 110.
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portance of assessing and controlling their banks' exposure to
international risk. The Basle Committee addressed these con-
cerns by formulating broad supervisory principles of "best
practices" in the proposed risk-based capital framework. In
this way, the Committee seeks to achieve a degree of conver-
gence of common banking standards. National authorities
must now implement these guidelines through detailed ar-
rangements best suited to their own national systems. While it
may be necessary to develop some form of a legal mechanism,
or to have the Basle Committee act as an international referee,
the Proposal stands as an exemplary model of international
banking cooperation.
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